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While size asymmetry (e.g., large buyer and small supplier) has been 
discussed in a no-disruption operation context (Lee & Johnson, 2012), little is 
known whether, how buyers react differently when different-sized suppliers cause 
different types of disruptions. Extant research suggests in a supplier-induced 
disruption supplier’s recovery actions yield various effects in a size-unbalancing 
setting, indicating a need for a deeper understanding of what buyers prefer in order 
to resolve disruptions caused by facing different sized suppliers and the rationales 
behind the decisions. Accordingly, this dissertation examines whether and how the 
supplier size and supplier-induced disruption type impact on commitment (i.e., 
enduring desire to maintain the relationship) as well as buyers’ preferred use of 
mediated power (i.e., use of extrinsic motivation to influence the target party) in 
Essay 1, and provides an extensive overview of the literature and a future research 
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INTRODUCTION 
Dissertation Overview  
A supply chain represents a network of all the member organizations or 
individuals and consists of the flows of products, services, information, and 
finances through upstream and downstream links (Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler, Min, 
Nix, & Smith, 2001). One of the critical elements in managing a supply chain is 
managing interorganizational relationships (Mentzer et al., 2001). Across various 
business research settings, practical and academic, interorganizational 
relationships have received significant attention and been examined with a large 
number of theories and methods employed. However, empirical studies assessing 
interorganizational relationships under disrupted and asymmetrical situations are 
still limited (Lee & Johnson, 2011; Cheng, Craighead, Wang, & Li, 2019). Given its 
nature of complexity and dynamics, a supply chain does not always function as 
planned or anticipated. When an unplanned and unanticipated event disrupts a 
supply chain, it may endanger the related firms with operational, financial, and 
relational risks (Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007).  
This dissertation focuses on buyer-supplier relationships particularly under 
disruption and essay 1 specifically involves in supplier-induced disruptions, which 
is when the suppliers are responsible for the disruptions. Supplier-induced 
disruptions occur frequently and lead to different consequences to the buyer-
supplier relationships. Apple watch production experienced a defective issue and 
a consequential delay resulting from the key components from one of two suppliers 
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(Wakabayashi & Luk, 2015), and Tesla’s first U.S. based fatal crash was related 
to its camera issue embedded in the Autopilot system provided by one of its largest 
sensor suppliers (Higgins, 2016). In these two cases, Apple kept the relationship 
with the supplier whereas Tesla ended the partnership. Little is understood what 
the elements are contributing to various perceptions and resolutions in different 
type of supplier-induced disruption. Empirical evidence suggests that different 
disruptions are attributed to different causes of the event and result in different 
levels of trust loss (Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2004). These findings encourage 
us to understand the impact of different disruptions on other perceptions of the 
buyers and preferred resolutions. Furthermore, supplier size has been examined 
as a critical factor in interorganizational relationships research with its implication 
of power and dependence (Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Handley & Benton, 2012). It will 
be critical to see the role of supplier size in a supplier-induced disruption and how 
the buyers, the victim, react differently. In summary, this dissertation focuses on 
contributing to interorganizational relationship research by exploring the effects of 
supplier-induced disruption on buyer’s behavioral actions in consideration of 
supplier size (essay 1) and synthesizing the literature on size asymmetry, 
highlighting the future research path for buyer-supplier relationship scholars 
(essay 2). 
Essay 1 (Chapter I) examines the effects of integrity- and competence-
based supplier-induced disruption on large buyer’s commitment with large and 
small suppliers. By employing scenario-based experiments, we identify that large 
buyers react with lower commitment to the suppliers when experiencing an 
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integrity-based disruption than a competence-based disruption. The findings 
further suggest that a larger buyer perceives higher commitment and more use of 
mediated power when facing a larger supplier compare with a small supplier. 
Moreover, a larger buyer shows more willingness to use the mediated power with 
a larger supplier than a smaller supplier through its commitment. 
Essay 2 (Chapter II) explores the research on size asymmetry in buyer-
supplier relationships. Firm size’s role in an inter-organizational relationship has 
been examined with various types of measurement adopted, giving scholars many 
opportunities to expand the field. An overview of the literature includes what 
studies offer in terms of research agenda opportunities for scholars to enhance the 
body of knowledge with an emphasis on incorporating supply chain disruptions. 
A brief literature review of supplier-induced disruptions is provided in the 
next section, followed by discussions concerning the types of disruption, size 
asymmetry, and power in buyer-supplier relationship areas. 
Supplier-induced Disruption Literature Review 
Supply chain disruptions, defined as unplanned product flow delays or 
stoppages (Craighead et al., 2007), can be negatively related to operational 
outcomes (Stauffer, 2003; Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a), shareholder wealth 
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2003), and other financial performance (Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2005b). This dissertation focuses on supplier-induced disruptions, which 
is when the suppliers are responsible for the disruptions. Supply chain researchers 
have established a substantial body of knowledge regarding supply chain 
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disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007; Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a, 2005b; 
Lumineau, Eckerd, & Handley, 2015), and started switching their attention to 
supplier-induced disruptions (Cheng et al., 2019; Kaufmann, Esslinger, & Carter, 
2018; Reimann, Kosmol, & Kaufmann, 2017; Wang, Craighead, & Li, 2014). 
Across most studies in supplier-induced disruptions, trust (i.e., firm belief in the 
reliability, truth, ability, or strength of the other party) is measured as a primary 
indicator of the effect of the disruptions (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin & Cooper, 2011; 
Kaufmann et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2014). Although trust contributes to a 
significant part of the buyer-supplier relationship, there is a need to expand to other 
behavioral actions in supplier-induced disruptions research.  
Integrity- and Competence-based Disruption 
The type of disruption is considered a critical factor that can alter 
interorganizational relationships in supply chain disruptions. This dissertation looks 
at two types of disruptions pertaining to the buyer-supplier exchange perspective: 
integrity- and competence-based disruptions. Two types of disruptions are 
distinguished by their causes of the event. Integrity-based disruptions are defined 
as suppliers breaching the values, principles, and social orders (Kim, Dirks, 
Cooper, & Ferrin, 2004). Competence-based disruptions are defined as the 
supplier’s lack of knowledge and technical skills (Kim et al. 2004). 
 Integrity- and competence-based disruptions are identified from the 
disruptions of the two well-established dimensions of trust in interorganizational 
relationships: competence- and integrity-based trust, because competence and 
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integrity represent two of the critical factors of trustworthiness (Butler & Cantrell, 
1984; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009; 
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Suggested from the schematic model from 
Reeder and Brewer (1979), there might be inherent differences lying in people’s 
assessment of the information delivered from competence and integrity 
disruptions. Extant research suggests that individuals tend to overweigh the 
negative information about integrity disruption (Dirks et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2006). 
Moreover, people consider an honest act as a discounted signal of honesty, 
whereas a dishonest act is perceived as a more reliable signal of dishonesty, 
therefore low integrity (Dirks et al. 2011; Kim, Diekmann, & Tenbrunsel, 2003; Kim 
et al., 2006). As a result, an integrity disruption as a critical indicator of low integrity, 
in general, leads to a more substantial impact on trust loss compared to a 
competence disruption (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009).  
Trust disruptions may not only violate trust. The individuals exposed to the 
context assess the negative information and form their perceptions and actions, 
following a dispositional attribution process (Kim et al., 2006; Reeder & Brewer, 
1979). Trust loss and trust repair have received substantial attention in 
interorganizational exchange disruptions (Kaufmann et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2004; 
Kim et al., 2006;) whereas another critical indicator of the relationship, 
commitment, has been largely overlooked in a disruption context. Commitment is 
defined as one party’s desire to maintain the relationship and is considered central 
to contributing to social exchange beyond economic business (Anderson & Weitz, 
1992; Cook & Emerson, 1978; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Thus, a gap lies in 
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expanding our understanding of the effects of supplier-induced disruptions on 
other perceptions and behavioral actions. 
Size Asymmetry 
Size asymmetry is defined as an imbalance in the size of an inter-
organizational relationship, based on the number of employees of the entire 
organization (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). In this dissertation, we distinguish the firm 
size based on the threshold suggested by Small Business Administration. SBA 
demonstrates that 100 is the lowest small business size standard in the number of 
employees matched to industries described in the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) (SBA, Small Business Size Regulations, 2019). On 
the other side of the spectrum, the largest firm size category falls at 5,000 and 
more for all industries listed in NAICS (SBA, Small Business Size Regulations, 
2021). To make the distinction between the large and small firm more salient, we 
chose the number of employees of 50 and 10,000 to describe for the small and 
large firms. Among other asymmetric characteristics of a relationship, size 
asymmetry simplifies the complexity of the interorganizational relationship. It has 
been found associated with other relationship characteristics, such as mutuality, 
conflict, interpersonal inconsistency, intensity, power, and dependence (Lee & 
Johnson, 2012; Ford & Saren, 2001; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Gundlach, Achrol, & 
Mentzer, 1995). Moreover, how size asymmetry impacts on opportunism and 
performance in buyer-supplier relationships has been examined (Villena & 
Craighead, 2017). Prior studies (Johnson & Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnson, 2012) 
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primarily focus on one type of the size asymmetric relationship (e.g. larger buyers 
and smaller suppliers) while all the degree and directions of the size asymmetry 
are included and studied from both parties (Villena & Craighead, 2017). However, 
both parties' wide-range behavioral actions on how they perceive and manage this 
asymmetric relationship are left unknown. 
To date, the studies on size asymmetry in the buyer-supplier relationship 
still focus on the relationship when operating under the normal modes. It is 
essential for firms to achieve a transparent view of their potential and ability by 
understanding the nature and influences of a size asymmetric relationship (Lee & 
Johnson, 2012; Ford & Saren, 2011), but It will be even more critical and 
informative to understand whether and how firms within a size asymmetric 
relationship perceive and react differently under a disruption scenario. In this 
dissertation, the role of size asymmetry in buyer-supplier relationship is explored 
under a supplier-induced disruption situation. 
Power 
 In this dissertation, we adopted the definition of power: “the ability of one 
individual or group to control or influence the behavior of another” (Hunt and Nevin, 
1974, p. 186). Power dynamics have been discussed in the body of knowledge on 
buyer-supplier disruptions in mitigating the negative consequences or moderating 
the effects (Handley & Benton, 2012; Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011). Two 
dimensions of power have been conceptualized in the literature: mediated power 
and unmediated power (Maloni & Benton, 2000). Mediated power is defined as 
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coercive, reward, and legitimate power bases; unmediated power is defined as 
expert and referent power (Benton & Maloni, 2005). Firms cannot deliberately exert 
the unmediated power and influence another party, whereas firms can administer 
the mediated power to influence the target (Benton & Malonti, 2005). Given its 
actionable nature, mediated power is often adopted by firms and examined in the 
research. Interestingly, substantial evidence suggests that utilizing mediated 
power hurts the quality of interorganizational relationships (Handley & Benton, 
2012b) with reduced satisfaction (Hunt & Nevin, 1974), less commitment (Brown, 
Lusch, & Nicholson, 1995), and reduced operational agreements (Frazier & 
Summers, 1984). It’s been missing that how would the firms who possess the 
mediated power prefer (or not) to exert power in a supplier-induced disruption. Key 
constructs definitions are summarized in table 1. 
Essay 1 and Essay 2 are presented in Chapter I and Chapter II of this 
dissertation. Each essay includes one independent study. The dissertation 
concludes with Chapter IV, a brief section that consolidates both studies' findings 
and proposes a future research path. 
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CHAPTER I - ESSAY 1 – BUYER’S PERCEPTION OF SUPPLIER-




While size asymmetry (i.e., large buyer and small supplier) has been 
discussed in a no-disruption operation context (Lee & Johnson, 2012), it is unclear 
whether and how a large buyer reacts differently when different-sized suppliers 
cause different types of disruptions. Extant research suggests in a supplier-
induced disruption, supplier’s recovery actions are less effective when the supplier 
is more dependent on the buyer (Cheng et al., 2019), indicating a need for deeper 
understanding of what buyers prefer in order to resolve disruptions caused by 
facing different sized suppliers. Accordingly, we examine the effect of supplier size 
and supplier-induced disruption type on commitment (i.e., enduring desire to 
maintain the relationship) as well as buyers’ preferred use of mediated power (i.e., 
use of extrinsic motivation to influence the target party). Grounded in commitment-
trust theory, our test examines the key mediating role of commitment in inter-
organizational relationships in supplier-induced disruptions. Conducting scenario-
based experiments, we find that a large buyer is more committed to a large supplier 
than to a small supplier in a supplier-induced disruption. Interestingly, a large buyer 
prefers to use mediated power strategies with a large supplier than with a small 
one. Commitment is found to mediate the effect of supplier size and mediated 
power, particularly with reward and monitor strategies. Although the interaction of 
supplier size and disruption type does not impact commitment or mediated power, 
integrity disruption damages buyer commitment more than competence disruption 
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does. Moreover, only in an integrity disruption does supplier size significantly 
impact the buyer's preference for using a reward strategy. 
Introduction 
A large buying firm tends to have a complex supply chain consisting of a 
network of diversified supply organizations (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). Managing 
relationships with all kinds of suppliers is critical to managing supply chains. As 
dynamic and complex as a supply chain can be, disruptions (i.e., unplanned 
stoppage or delays in a supply chain flow) frequently occur. A supplier-induced 
disruption can lead to devastating effects, even termination of the existing buyer-
supplier relationship (Mir, Aloysius, & Eckerd, 2017). It is critical to understand how 
buying firms perceive and react to supplier-induced disruptions. It is unclear how 
large buyers perceive the relationship when facing large versus small suppliers in 
a supplier-induced disruption. 
Small businesses are emerging and contributing to the U.S. economy. 
Organizations with fewer than 250 employees account for 95% of the nonfarm 
companies in the United States and more than half of all U.S. manufacturing 
employees (Arend 2006; Beekman & Robinson 2004; U.S. Bureau of the Census 
2018). Supply chain researchers have examined the selection decisions and 
evaluation of both large and small suppliers (Pearson & Ellram, 1995) as well as 
the significant effects of size asymmetry (i.e., large buyers and small suppliers; 
small buyers and large suppliers) on inter-organizational relationships (Johnsen & 
Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnsen, 2012; Villena & Craighead, 2017). Specifically, 
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researchers have identified supplier size’s effects on buyer-supplier relationships 
from small suppliers’ perspectives (Johnson & Ford, 2008) or from both small 
suppliers’ and large buyers’ perspectives (Lee & Johnson, 2012). However, 
researchers’ discussions tend to be limited to no-disruption circumstances. Given 
the supplier size’s critical role in buyer-supplier relationships, it is unclear in a 
disruption scenario how large buyers perceive the relationship and whether they 
react differently when facing different-sized suppliers. 
Firm size asymmetry implies the existence of power and dependence, 
which matters in coping with supplier-induced disruptions. Suppliers’ recovery 
actions are less effective when the supplier is more dependent on the buyer 
(Cheng, Craighead, Wang, & Li, 2019). Suppliers’ recovery actions are active 
initiatives, which are passive for buyers. It would be valuable to identify buyer’s 
preferences for adopting strategies in a supplier-induced incident. When facing a 
small supplier, a large buyer can exert external influence (i.e., mediated power) on 
the small supplier. Therefore, we focus on using mediated power as a buyer’s 
preferred resolution in supplier-induced disruptions. This research addresses how 
the buying firm (i.e., the victim) perceives the situation and which strategies are 
preferred for dealing with the supplier.  
Shaping our conceptual model, our theoretical framework aligns with the 
key mediating variable model from the commitment-trust theory (CTT). When the 
supplier causes a disruption, the buyer suffers and may reassess the relationship 
with the supplier. When dealing with different-sized suppliers, a large buyer faces 
various levels of relationship termination costs, switching difficulties, and benefits 
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(Whitten & Wakefield, 2006; Farrell & Shapiro, 1988). A large supplier can provide 
to a large buyer more relationship benefits, higher relationship termination costs, 
and more switching difficulties than to a small supplier (Whitten & Wakefield, 2006; 
Farrell & Shapiro, 1988; Weiss & Anderson, 1992). CTT suggests that higher 
relationship termination costs and more relationship benefits lead to higher 
relationship commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). It is unknown whether these 
factors still hold in a supplier-induced disruption. 
 At the CTT’s core is the key mediating role of commitment, defined as one 
party's desire to develop and maintain a long-term relationship with another party 
(Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). We propose that the buyer's 
preference for using a mediated power strategy serves as a potential outcome and 
that commitment mediates supplier size and the mediated power strategy in a 
supplier-induced disruption. Mediated power strategy is defined as the use of 
extrinsic motivation to exert influence on the target party (Brown, Lusch, & 
Nicholson, 1995; Handley & Banton, 2012). By examining various types of 
disruptions, we introduced various causes of the disruptions to examine supplier 
size’s effects. To examine our conceptual framework, we conducted scenario-
based experiments with 266 MTurk workers who have working experience in the 
supply chain area. 
 This dissertation contributes to the literature and practice in several ways. 
First, contrary to our hypothesis derived from extant research (Handley & Benton, 
2012), we find large buyers prefer to exert mediated power on large suppliers 
rather than on small ones, providing boundary conditions in using mediated power. 
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Second, while commitment-trust theory and commitment’s mediating role have 
been examined in buyer-supplier relationships (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wu, Weng, 
& Huang, 2012), we propose a potential antecedent, a moderator, and an outcome 
in the CTT model and test it in a disruption context. Third, although the disruption 
type does not interact with supplier size, commitment’s mediating effect is only 
salient with the integrity disruption, which enhances the effect’s boundary 
conditions. Finally, our results provide implications for (a) buyers as they design 
their supply base and precautionary plans and (b) suppliers as they effectively 
communicate with buyers in coping with a supplier-induced disruption. 
Literature Review 
Large Buyer Facing Large and Small Suppliers 
A large buyer tends to have a diversified supply base with varying supplier 
sizes based on the organization's number of employees (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). 
It is critical to understand the role of supplier size in order to effectively manage 
buyer-supplier relationships (Adams, Khoja, & Kauffman, 2012). Among a 
relationship's other characteristics, supplier size simplifies the inter-organizational 
relationship's complexity and implies various facets of the supplier's attributes. 
Supplier size has been associated with other relationship characteristics, such as 
mutuality, conflict, interpersonal inconsistency, intensity, switching costs, 
termination costs, power, and dependence (Farrell & Shapiro, 1988; Gulati & 
Sytch, 2007; Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995; Lee & Johnsen, 2012; Ford & 
Saren, 2001; Weiss & Anderson, 1992;). Small suppliers tend to heavily depend 
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on large buyers; therefore, large buyers perceive small suppliers as their power 
targets with lower switching costs compared to large suppliers (Weiss & Anderson, 
1992). Supplier size’s effect on the inter-organizational relationship has been 
primarily examined under normal operations in which no disruptions occur. When 
the supplier causes a disruption, the buyer reassesses the cause and the current 
relationship. Though the negative effect on the buyer-supplier relationship is 
almost certain, it is less clear whether the small and large suppliers share the same 
level of blame. It is interesting to explore whether the large buyer tends to be more 
comprehensive with higher commitment and less use of mediated power or less 
tolerant with small versus large suppliers. 
Integrity- and Competence-based Disruptions 
The disruption type is a critical factor, which can alter inter-organizational 
relationships in supply chain disruptions. This dissertation identifies both integrity- 
and competence-based disruptions of the buyer-supplier exchange. Integrity-
based disruptions are defined as suppliers breaching values, principles, and social 
orders while competence-based disruptions result from suppliers’ lack of 
knowledge and technical skills (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006).  
 In inter-organizational relationships, integrity- and competence-based 
disruptions are identified among those of the two well-established dimensions of 
trust (i.e., competence- and integrity-based), representing two critical factors of 
trustworthiness (Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Kim et al., 2006; Janowicz-Panjaitan & 
Krishnan, 2009; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Based on the schematic 
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model in Reeder and Brewer's (1979) study, there might be inherent differences in 
people's assessment of information related to competence and integrity 
disruptions. Extant research suggests that individuals tend to overemphasize 
integrity disruptions’ negative details (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2011; Kim et 
al., 2006). Moreover, people tend to assume that high-integrity parties do not 
behave dishonestly no matter what the circumstances. In contrast, low-integrity 
parties may display honest or dishonest behaviors. Therefore, people consider a 
righteous act a discounted signal of honesty, whereas a dishonest act is perceived 
as a more reliable signal of dishonesty and low integrity (Dirks et al., 2011; Kim et 
al., 2006). 
Power Bases 
 Power is defined as the ability of one party to influence the target party and 
has been widely discussed in buyer-supplier relationship management (Hunt & 
Nevin, 1974; Huo, Flynn & Zhao, 2017; Reimann & Ketchen, 2017) and has been 
suggested to have mixed effects on buyer-supplier relationships (Caniel & 
Geldermann, 2007; Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008). If in a normal operation, a 
large buyer hesitates to influence or control suppliers, a supplier-induced 
disruption would provide a legitimate reason for the buyers to reinforce and guard 
their benefits. In tackling supply chain disruptions, extant research mainly focuses 
on power-balanced scenarios and has called for future research on imbalanced 
distribution of power (Kaufmann et al., 2018).  Cheng et al. (2019) found that when 
a supplier is more dependent on the buyer, the less effective the supplier’s 
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recovery actions are (Cheng et al., 2019). This impact may result from lack of 
understanding which repair strategies buying firms prefer to use with different-
sized suppliers. Two power dimensions have been conceptualized in the literature: 
mediated and unmediated power (Maloni & Benton, 2000; Benton & Maloni, 2005). 
Mediated power depends on coercive, reward, and legitimate bases; unmediated 
power consists of referent and expert power (Benton & Maloni, 2005). Firms 
cannot deliberately exert unmediated power and influence another party, whereas 
firms can exercise mediated ability to control another party (Benton & Malonti, 
2005). Given its actionable nature, mediated power is frequently adopted by firms 
and examined in the research. 
This dissertation focuses mainly on the buyer's use of mediated power; the 
omni construct; and the individual bases: reward, coercive, and legal legitimate 
(Benton & Malonti, 2005). Reward power is defined as the buyer's ability to reward 
the supplier as promised when the supplier complies. Coercive (or penalties) 
power is the buyer's ability to punish the supplier if failing to meet the agreed upon 
requirements. Legal, legitimate power is defined as contracts and other legal 
agreements specifying the supplier’s obligations. Studies suggest that mediated 
power bases tend to be implemented collectively instead of separately (Raven & 
Kruglanski, 1970; Handley & Benton, 2012). In their seminal work, French and 
Raven (1959) discussed the difficulty of distinguishing between reward and 
coercive power. For example, an additional bonus is promised to the supplier if he 
can meet the requirement; that bonus is considered a reward. However, 
withholding the bonus if the supplier cannot meet the buyer’s requirement may be 
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perceived as coercion (French & Raven, 1959; Handley & Benton, 2012). 
Furthermore, empirical studies suggest that reward, coercive, and legal legitimate 
power bases are employed jointly (Brown et al., 1995; Frazier & Summers, 1984;). 
In the current study, we describe a scenario to distinguish between reward and 
coercion not only to avoid missing individual effects but also to include mediated 
power’s omni construct in order to identify the joint effects (Handley & Benton, 
2012). Therefore, we hypothesize that individual bases' effects would lead to 
positive or negative effects as a joint construct, and we explore those individual 
effects. Supplier-induced disruptions are multi-faceted in inter-organizational 
exchanges, thereby impacting the relationship at varying levels under varying 
circumstances. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
This research draws on the premise that the commitment-trust theory (CTT) 
is critical to the supplier size’s impact on buyer-supplier relationships in a supplier-
induced disruption. CTT highlights the key mediating role of commitment and trust 
in an inter-organizational relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Researchers either 
consider both trust and commitment as key mediators (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) or 
treat each one as a critical construct in the relational exchange (Doney & Cannon, 
1997; Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Jap & Ganesan, 2000). Within the original key 
mediating variable (KMV) model proposed in Morgan and Hunt (1994), 
antecedents include relationship termination costs, shared values, relationship 
benefits, communication, and opportunistic behavior. Outcomes consist of 
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acquiescence, propensity to leave, cooperation, functional conflict, and decision-
making uncertainty. The KMV model has been empirically examined in a supply 
chain study involving an ordinary (i.e., no disruption) context (Wu, Weng, & Huang, 
2012). In a disruption scenario, trust has been widely used as the central construct 
of interest (Esslinger et al., 2019). Commitment, another key mediator, is 
considered central to contributing to social exchange beyond economic business 
(Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Cook & Emerson, 1978; Morgan & Hunt, 1994); yet, it 
is discussed primarily in a non-disruption context.  
In this study, we focus on commitment’s critical mediating role not only in a 
negative event context but also within a power-imbalanced setting (see Figure 1). 
A supplier-induced disruption provides the buyer with negative details about the 
supplier, thus giving the buyer reasons to reassess the relationship with a reduced 
level of willingness in order to maintain the relationship (Mir et al., 2016). 
Therefore, we posit that a supplier-induced disruption would negatively impact a 
buyer's commitment. 
Supplier size reflects the level of dependence differentials and associated 
switching costs. An undefined element of termination costs (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994), switching costs include perceived economic costs (Jones, Mothersbaugh, 
& Beatty, 2002), benefit loss costs, brand relationship loss costs, monetary loss 
costs (Burnham, Frels, & Mahajan, 2003; Whitten & Wakefield, 2006), and 
perceived time and effort (Jones et al., 2002). Dealing with a large supplier, a large 
buyer perceives greater associated costs involved in terminating the exchange 
relationship and switching to another large supplier. In contrast, terminating the 
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relationship with a small supplier and switching to another small supplier would 
cost the large buyer less time, effort, and money. Higher termination and switching 
costs involved with a large supplier contribute to greater switching difficulty and the 
large buyer’s increased dependence, and vice versa. In a supplier-induced 
disruption, buyers as the victims naturally have a legitimate reason to assert their 
rights. When supplier switching difficulties are lower, buying firms seek 
opportunities to exert power to influence the supplier in buyer-favored directions 
(Handley & Benton, 2012). Therefore, when facing a large supplier, a large buyer 
would prefer to use less mediated power than when facing a small supplier 
(Handley & Benton, 2012). 
H1. A large buyer prefers to use less mediated power— coercive, legal 
legitimate, and reward strategies—with a large supplier than with a small supplier. 
 
Rather than supplier size differential directly affecting the use of mediated 
power as proposed in Hypothesis 1, the relationship between supplier size and 
mediated power is arguably a function of the commitment’s impact. As previously 
discussed, supplier size influences termination and switching costs. A large buyer 
uses the magnitude of these costs to assess the relationship’s importance, thus  
determining the relationship commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Aligning with 
CTT, supplier size is associated with relationship termination costs and 
relationship benefits, which are key antecedents and positively related to 
commitment (Morgan & Hunt. 1994).  
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 Aligning CTT, commitment serves as a key mediator in an inter-
organizational relationship. Specifically, in the CTT’s KMV model, relationship 
commitment is negatively correlated with the propensity to leave (i.e., the likelihood 
to terminate the relationship) (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). The propensity to leave, 
perceived as a level of instability, represents a costly performance outcome. In a 
supplier-induced disruption, mediated power as a preferred resolution strategy can 
be considered a potential outcome of a supplier-induced disruption as a result of 
the buyer's commitment to the supplier. 
H2. A large buyer's preference for mediated power— coercive, legal 
legitimate, and reward strategies—is mediated by the buyer’s commitment to the 
supplier. 
In this dissertation, we focus on two types of disruption: integrity- and 
competence-based (hereafter, expressed as integrity and competence 
disruptions). Integrity disruptions are related to the supplier’s values and principles, 
whereas competence disruptions are due to a lapse in skill and performance.  
Based on the supplier-induced disruption’s cause, large buyers analyze the 
rationale behind the disruption and reassess the exchange relationship with the 
supplier. Competence disruptions are perceived as indicators of the supplier’s 
competence level (Reeder & Brewer, 1979). Thus, the buyer believes that the 
supplier with greater ability will be able to perform competently, while the supplier 
with less ability will perform less competently (Dirks et al., 2011). Conversely, 
buyers not only attribute the integrity disruption’s cause to the supplier's low 
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integrity and questionable values and principles but also perceive that the supplier 
will be dishonest (Dirks et al., 2011). Thus, this disruption will happen again when 
the supplier deems it necessary. As a critical indicator of low integrity that generally 
leads to damaging the buyer’s trust in the supplier, integrity disruption—in contrast 
to competence disruption—will, in turn, diminish the buyer’s commitment to the 
supplier and substantially deteriorate the relationship (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 
2009). 
 Given the nature of competence and integrity disruptions, the buyer’s trust 
in and, thus, commitment to the supplier are damaged differently. If a supplier-
induced disruption motivates the large buyer to exert power, the buyer will have a 
stronger motivation to exert mediated power when faced with integrity disruptions 
because the buyer will perceive such disruptions as evidence of the supplier’s 
dishonesty, lower integrity, and untrustworthiness. In contrast, the buyer would 
perceive the supplier as less capable in a competence disruption and, therefore, 
be less motivated to exert power over the supplier. Thus, we posit the following: 
H3a. Integrity disruption diminishes the commitment of a large buyer to its 
supplier more than competence disruption does. 
H3b. Integrity disruption leads to a large buyer's using more mediated 
power than competence disruption does. 
Suppliers’ size differential is also an indicator of levels of information sharing 
and uncertainty. A large buying firm is clearly aware that the size leverage and 
associated dependence and power advantage can deter a small supplier from 
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taking advantage of the relationship (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). In contrast, large 
firms are more likely to hide their agenda and, therefore, be less transparent in 
terms of sharing information compared to small firms (Villena & Craighead, 2017).    
Although in a general context, large buyer would be more committed to the 
large supplier than to the small one (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), in a disruption the 
buyer’s suspicion of the reason behind the disruption would not be decreased 
facing with a large supplier. With larger suppliers’ greater uncertainty and greater 
intention to hide information, large buyers will use the supplier-induced disruption 
as an opportunity to evaluate their suppliers. In a supplier-induced disruption 
situation and primarily when the supplier's unethical purpose causes the 
disruption, the buyer’s concerns about the large supplier are confirmed. Therefore, 
in an integrity disruption, a large buyer may suspect a large supplier, more than a 
small supplier, of being the disruption’s cause, thus leading to more devastating 
damage to the buyer’s relationship commitment and greater use of mediated 
power with a large supplier. 
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H4a. Integrity disruption is more damaging to a large buyer's commitment 
to a large supplier than to a small supplier. 
H4b. Integrity disruption strengthens a large buyer's willingness to exert 
mediated power- coercive, legal legitimate, and reward strategies—on a large 
supplier than on a small supplier. 
Research Methods 
Using a vignette-based experiment to collect the data for this research, we 
asked participants to assume the role of a buying firm's representative and to 
handle a buyer-supplier relationship issue (Eckerd, 2016; Rungtusanatham, Wallin, 
& Eckerd, 2011). Vignette-based experiments engage participants with immersive 
scenarios commonly found in inter-organizational relationships (Rungtusanatham 
et al., 2011). In such experiments, participants are free to reveal their behaviors, 
thoughts, and decisions after being presented a scenario. 
A 2 (large vs. small supplier) x 2 (competence vs. integrity disruption) 
between-subject scenario-based experiment was conducted to determine a large 
buyer's perspective of the relationship after experiencing a supplier-induced 
disruption. As with Rungtusanatham et al. (2011), we included a common module 
(constant statements) and an experimental module (varied statements). 
Participants were first assigned the role of the large buyer, which has a relationship 
with a large or small supplier in a general buyer-supplier exchange. The scenarios 
were presented sequentially, with the first scenario describing the supplier’s size 
as either large or small. The second scenario involved a type of disruption, either 
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competence- or integrity-based. The buying and supplying firms’ sizes were 
categorized based on the number of employees; a large supplier has more than 
10,000 employees while a small supplier has fewer than 50 employees. The Small 
Business Administration (SBA), an autonomous U.S. government agency assisting 
small businesses, suggests the criteria for defining a small firm based on employee 
size, which can range from fewer than 100 to fewer than 1500 depending on the 
industries (SBA, Small Business Size Regulations, 2021).  Consistent with the 
definition and to make the difference more salient for participants to identify the 
size difference, we chose employee numbers fewer than 50 for small firms and 
more than 10,000 for large firms.  The participants were presented with the 
following scenario: a supplier caused a disruption by shipping a batch of defective 
products to a plant, resulting in the company’s experiencing delays to its customers. 
The reason for the disruption can be attributed to either integrity disruption or 
competence disruption. Integrity disruption is caused by the supplier's purposefully 
purchasing low-quality materials to inflate margins. In contrast, competence 
disruption is caused by lack of knowledge and expertise. This experiment’s 
scenarios are presented in Appendix A. A counterbalancing approach of 
manipulation checks was used (Perdue & Summers, 1986). Participants in the 
main test were asked the manipulation check question after being exposed to 
manipulated scenarios but before being asked the question about the dependent 
measures. Participants in the pilot test were asked the manipulation check 
question after being asked the dependent measures questions. For the dependent 
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measures, participants were asked to describe their perceived commitment and 
preferred power strategy.  
Pilot Test, Sample, Manipulation, and Realism Checks 
A pilot test with 56 subjects recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk, 
73.2 percent male, Mage=33.25) provided room for improvement in the experiment 
design, and minor changes were made to enhance the clarity before collecting the 
main study’s data. We then recruited 266 MTurk workers (65.5 percent male, 
Mage=35.51) for the main study. MTurk has been identified as providing reliable 
results (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013), generalizability beyond the 
contextual settings (Kaufmann et al., 2018; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), and even 
more attentive compared to the traditional subject pool samples (Hauser & 
Schwarz, 2016). Given the nature of the disruption event, participants 
anonymously recruited from online survey platform are free from confidential 
concerns and more willing to reveal their thoughts (Porter, Outlaw, Gale, & Cho, 
2019). To achieve adequately qualified participants for this study we conducted 
several screening methods. In the recruiting message, it is clearly stated that only 
participants have working experience in the supply chain will be qualified for 
participating the study and paid. In addition, a qualifier of job function with 
“management” provided by MTurk was implemented to narrow down the manager 
role of the participants. Furthermore, industries the participants work in and length 
of working experience in the supply chain area were collected as control variable. 
With the use of attention check, recruiting requirement and qualification settings 
 27 
as screening methods, proper panel of participants from MTurk can be by and 
large achieved (Sharpe Wessling, Huber, & Netzer, 2017).   
Manipulation checks were performed, and manipulated factors were 
confirmed. For the first scenario, a question ("What is the size of the supplier?") 
was used to assess the supplier's perceived size. Response to the large supplier 
scenario was significantly higher (M = 6.04, SD = 1.00) than to the small supplier 
scenario (M = 2.71, SD = 1.93, F (1,265) = 305.45, p < 0.001). For the second 
scenario, the average of three items was used to assess competence as the 
perceived cause of failure: lack of skill, a competency issue, and insufficient 
knowledge. The average of three items was used to measure integrity as the cause: 
intentional, dishonest, and a disruption of principles. Response on the competency 
scale was significantly higher in the competence treatment (M = 5.34, SD =1.03) 
than in the integrity treatment (M = 4.58, SD = 1.54, F(1,265) = 21.82, p < 0.001). 
Response on the integrity scale was significantly higher for the integrity treatment 
(M = 5.49, SD =1.21) than for the competence treatment (M = 4.48, SD = 1.63, 
F(1,265) = 33.88, p < 0.001). All items used in the manipulation checks were 
assessed on a seven-point Likert scale. 
A realism check assesses the extent to which participants find the scenarios 
provided to be realistic and believable and whether participants can relate the 
scenarios to real life (Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). More specifically, participants 
were asked to assess their agreement or disagreement with the three statements: 
“I found the situation described in the scenario to be realistic”, “I believe the 
situation described in the scenario could happen in real life”, and “I took my 
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assumed role seriously while conducting the survey”. The average of three items 
was used to assess the perceived level of realism on a seven-point Likert scale. 
Based on the realism check question, our participants agreed that the study's 
design was realistic (M = 5.84, SD = 0.85). 
Measurement and Model Assessment 
 In addition to the manipulation and realism checks, several multi- and 
single-item variables were included in this study. To determine size asymmetry’s 
and disruption type’s impact on buyer-supplier relationships, we measured buyers’ 
commitment to the supplier causing the disruption and the buyers’ preferred 
resolution strategies. The multi-item variable was used to measure commitment 
and was adopted from previously validated scales from Gray and Handley (2011). 
The single-item variable for measuring mediated power was adapted from the 
multi-item scales from Handley and Benton (2012). The items for the multi-item 
scales are presented in Appendix B, and single-item variables are summarized 
below.  
As each of the power bases was measured by a single-item question, 
common method bias could exist and threaten the analysis (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). To minimize the likelihood of such bias, we ensured all 
the participants' confidentiality, randomized the order of specific questions, located 
measurement of independent and dependent variables separately within the 
survey, and clarified the scales via a pilot test (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Moreover, 
we conducted a supplementary CFA incorporating an additional, unmeasured 
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methods factor and the hypothesized factors (Podsakoff et al., 2003) to estimate 
the possibility of common method bias. As a result, each item continued to load 
significantly on its intended construct (p < .001). While we cannot conclude that 
our analysis is entirely free from common method bias, these designs and 
assessments leave us with less concern about such bias in this research. 
 Control variables were included in the model to account for their potentially 
confounding influence on the analysis. Length of working experience was 
measured by a single-item question asking the amount of time (in years) the 
participants had worked in the supply chain area. Demographic information such 
as age, gender, education level were collected. Descriptive statistics and 
correlations among all study variables are presented in Table 2. 
 To evaluate the multi-item scales used in the model (commitment), a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted in Mplus 8.5. Overall, 
measurement model fit is acceptable based on several model fit indices 
(RMSEA=0.10 with 90% CI:0.051, 0.159; χ2/df=7.30; CFI=0.99; TLI=0.98; 
SRMR=0.01) after eliminating 36 attention check failures (N=230). Convergent 
validity was reflected by the significant loadings of all the construct commitment’s  
items (see Appendix B). Reliability for our multi-item construct commitment was 
strongly confirmed by Cronbach’s alpha value (0.94>0.70), composite radiality 
(0.96>0.60), and average variance extracted (AVE: 0.85>0.50) (Bagozzi & Yi, 
1988; Carmines & Zeller, 1979; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
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Analysis and Results 
Linear regression analysis and PROCESS Model 4 and Model 1 with 5,000 
bootstrap samples were used to test our hypotheses (Hayes & Little, 2018). 
PROCESS macros from Hayes (2018) are often used to estimate simple and 
advanced statistical models, such as moderating and mediating models used in 
research. Supplier size (binary variable: 1=large buyer with large supplier/0=large 
buyer with a small supplier) was used as the independent variable. Commitment, 
mediated power (average of all bases), and individual power bases were used as 
dependent variables. Table 3 summarizes the regression results. 
 Results in Table 3 suggest that supplier size positively affects a large 
buyer's preference for mediated power, particularly reward, in a supplier-induced 
disruption, which is the opposite result of what is predicted in Hypothesis 1. We 
predict in H1 that the large buyer would prefer more to use mediated power with 
small suppliers than with large suppliers whereas we find that large buyer would 
prefer more to use mediated power with large suppliers than small suppliers. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  
 In H2, we predict that the commitment mediates the relations between 
supplier size and buyer’s preference for mediated power, measured jointly and 
individually. To test H2, we ran the supplier size’s indirect effects on the preference 
for mediated power through commitment using PROCESS Model 4. Results 
suggest that supplier size (large vs. small) significantly impacts a large buyer's 
preferred use of mediated power with an effect size of 0.18 with 95% CI [.07,.31] 
through this buyer's commitment to its supplier. Specifically, the supplier size’s 
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indirect effects on both reward and monitor are significant with an effect size of 
0.46 and 0.10 with 95% CI [.18,.74] and [.01,.23], respectively. However, the 
supplier size’s indirect effect on the use of coercive power is not significant (-.019, 
95% CI [-.10,.08]). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. 
 Linear regression results of disruption type’s effect on commitment and 
mediated power bases are summarized in Table 4. In H3a, we predict that integrity 
disruption damages more to the larger buyer’s commitment than competence 
disruption does. The finding confirms that integrity disruption damages the 
commitment significantly more than competence disruption does at a p-value level 
of 0.05. In H3b, we predict that integrity disruption strengthens the large buyer’s 
preference of mediated power than competence disruption does, but the 
regression analysis is not significant. Hypothesis 3a is supported, but 3b is not. 
 In H4a and H4b, we test the interaction between supplier size and disruption 
type and predict that Integrity disruption damage more to a large buyer's 
commitment to a large supplier than to a small supplier (H4a), and integrity 
disruption strengthens a large buyer's willingness to exert mediated power- 
coercive, legal legitimate, and reward strategies—on a large supplier than on a 
small supplier (H4b). To test H4a and H4b, we ran PROCESS Model 1. 
Summarized in Table 5, regression results suggest that the interaction does not 
significantly affect commitment or preferred mediated power. H4a and H4b are not 
supported. However, supplier size’s conditional effects on preferred use of 
mediated power with effect size of .34 and 95% CI [.02,.66], particularly reward 
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with effect size of 1.12 and 95% CI [.49,1.75], are significant in an integrity 
disruption but not in a competence disruption. 
Discussion 
Implications 
While size asymmetry has been discussed in managing buyer-supplier 
relationships, discussions tend to be limited to one pair (large buyer and small 
supplier or small buyer and large supplier) of the relationship and under a normal 
(i.e., no disruption) circumstance (Lee & Johnson, 2012). Large buying firms often 
have a complex supply chain network including diversified supplying 
organizations. We enhanced the discussion of supplier size’s effect by including 
both large and small suppliers. Furthermore, we identified the boundary conditions 
(i.e., supplier-induced disruption type) by which supplier size’s effect would or 
would not hold. Grounded in commitment-trust theory, our scenario-based 
experiments tested commitment’s key mediating role in buyer-supplier 
relationships in supplier-induced disruptions.  
Our findings provide several interesting insights. First, while Handley and 
Benton (2012) suggested that the buyers would exert less mediated power on 
large suppliers (thus posing greater switching difficulties), we show that large 
buyers prefer to rely on more of the mediated power when dealing with large 
suppliers compared to small ones in a supplier-induced disruption. In a non-
disrupted day, buyers would be more concerned with the large suppliers’ 
commitment due to higher dependence, thus reducing the use of mediated power, 
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which often negatively affects commitment (Benton & Maloni, 2005; Hunt and 
Nevin, 1974). In fact, we confirmed that buyers remain more committed to large 
suppliers (compared to small suppliers) even when those suppliers cause 
disruptions; such commitment can be the result of dependence and switching 
difficulties (Handley & Benton, 2012). However, when a supplier-induced 
disruption occurs, buyers may attribute cause to the suppliers’ opportunistic 
behaviors. Compared to small suppliers, large suppliers tend to share less 
information and are perceived as being more opportunistic (Villena & Craighead, 
2017). Large buyers may be well aware of that tendency and suspect that large 
suppliers’ opportunistic behaviors are behind the disruption; thus, those buyers 
prefer to exert mediated power on large suppliers. Furthermore, large buyers are 
also more dependent on large suppliers; therefore, a reward strategy may be 
adopted to influence and control the large suppliers but not to be punitive. We 
believe this result reveals boundary conditions in exerting mediated power and 
also indicates the need for further examining the psychological rationale behind 
those boundaries. 
Second, while firm size has been suggested to be associated with many 
buyer-supplier relationship characteristics, such as trust, power, dependence, 
commitment, or knowledge in smooth operations (Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 
1995; Johnson & Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnson, 2012; Morgan & Hunt, 1994), the 
literature is largely silent about firm size’s impact when buyer-supplier exchanges 
are disrupted. One exception in the literature is Cheng et al. (2019, demonstrating 
that in a supplier-induced event, the effectiveness of supplier’s recovery actions is 
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related to the buyer’s perception of supplier dependence. Based on commitment-
trust theory, we used supplier size as the antecedent and mediated power as the 
outcome to examine commitment’s mediating role in a disruption context. Our 
finding confirms that the positive connection between a supplier firm’s size and a 
buyer’s commitment to the relationship still holds in a disrupted situation (Holmlund 
& Kock, 1996). Furthermore, we found that the positive connection between a 
supplier firm’s size and the use of mediated power is effective, mediated by buyer 
commitment. Complementing the discussion about the resolutions’ effectiveness, 
we show that the preference of the buyer (i.e., the victim) in resolving the disruption 
is dependent on supplier size, mediated by buyer commitment. 
Third, while the disruption type has been studied as a critical factor that 
deteriorates to varying degrees the buyer-supplier relationship (Dirks et al. 2009), 
we took an additional step in investigating the disruption type’s interaction with 
supplier size. Our results show that integrity disruption has stronger negative 
effects on commitment than competence disruption does, thus providing empirical 
evidence of the effects of disruption types (Dirks et al., 2011). Although the 
interaction between disruption type and supplier size is not significant in testing the 
effect of supplier size, the conditional effect of supplier on mediated power only 
holds in an integrity disruption. On the one hand, this finding confirms that large 
buyers perceive integrity disruption as a more severe event (compared to 
competence disruption) and attribute the cause to dishonesty and low integrity, 
thus significantly reducing commitment. Moreover, the connection between 
supplier size and mediated power only holds true in an integrity disruption, thus 
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strengthening that disruption’s salient role. On the other hand, the buyer would not 
have a different preference regarding the use of mediated power under a different 
type of disruption. The disconnect between the disruption type’s impact on the 
buyer’s commitment and preferred use of mediated power needs to be further 
researched. 
 Finally, our research provides managerial insights for both suppliers and 
buyers. Given the diversity of a large buyer’s supply base and the frequency of 
supplier-induced disruptions, both buyers and suppliers should work to be aware 
of and manage their relationships. Large suppliers should recognize that although 
buyer’s commitment to them may remain relatively higher than to small suppliers 
in a supplier-induced disruption, buyers may prefer to use mediated power 
strategies, particularly rewards, with them. Although they may not be true 
“rewards,” their selection could indicate that the buyer intends to exert influence 
and control over large suppliers and that an integrity disruption’s effect is more 
salient. Small suppliers should be aware of their disadvantages in terms of lower 
buyer commitment compared to large suppliers’ when both small and large 
suppliers cause disruptions. Given the knowledge of the perceptions of buyers and 
the resolution they may initiate, both large and small suppliers should be able to 
more effectively communicate with buyers in coping with a supplier-induced 
disruption. In addition, our research offers large buyers insights for designing their 




Limitations and Future Research 
Our findings’ limitations should also be considered. First, although our 
experiment design may be internally valid with controls and manipulated scenarios, 
the scenarios’ general description cannot fully capture all the characteristics in real 
cases, which would lose external validity and generalizability in specific industries. 
Observational or archival data regarding buyers’ real actions after supplier-induced 
disruptions can be used to complement our study. Second, using a single 
individual to represent the buying firm’s decision-making manager is one limitation. 
This approach has been largely adopted in SCM research to evaluate 
interpersonal trust, interorganizational trust, and psychological contract over-
fulfilment (Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011; Esslinger et al., 2019; Kaufmann et al., 
2018). We acknowledge our design’s shortcomings and encourage future 
researchers to replicate real decision-making processes by incorporating team-
oriented discussions. Third, providing participants two descriptive scenarios may 
not have eliminated or captured the responses’ potential bias. Future researchers 
could use visualization techniques (e.g., video of simulated scenarios) in their 
experiment design to help participants place themselves in the designed scenario. 
Fourth, while we presented the scenarios sequentially, we were unable to capture 
all the changes in perception before, during, and after the disruption. Future 
studies could use longitudinal designs with multistage experiments to better infer 
causality. Fifth, we used binary variables to measure supplier size and disruption 
type which may result in potential oversimplification. Future research can use 
continuous variables for measuring supplier size and disruption type to ensure the 
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depth of the information captured by the participants. Finally, we provided a one-
sided opinion (i.e., of a large buyer) and disregarded the opinions of three potential 
parties (large supplier, small buyer, and small supplier) in a dyad relationship. The 
voices from all sides are worth are worth hearing to achieve a comprehensive 
understanding of all parties’ reactions. 
 We believe several other research paths could be developed based on this 
current research. Future studies could extend commitment-trust theory in a 
disruption setting by incorporating other psychological constructs to enrich the 
understanding of decision-making processes and psychological reasons leading 
to the outcomes. This approach could contribute to not only the theory but also the 
supply chain field. Incorporating other related psychological constructs could better 
bridge the antecedents by capturing more psychological changes, thus better 
explaining the reason behind various outcomes and performances in various 
contexts. Specifically, dynamic contexts are common in the supply chain world; 
thus, a deeper understanding of the potential reactions in a supplier-induced 
disruption would be insightful for both researchers and practitioners. Furthermore, 
while our study has captured certain psychological reasons and behaviors in a 
disruption context, much more research is needed before we can fully understand 
the rationale involved. Therefore, we encourage researchers to consider 
qualitative studies that would capture rich data in interpreting real supply chain 
managers’ perceptions and decision-making processes, thus providing a deeper 
and wider understanding of the inter-organizational relationships in a supplier-
induced disruption. 
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CHAPTER II - ESSAY 2 – SIZE ASYMMETRY IN BUYER-SUPPLIER 






While firm size has often been included as a default control variable for 
inter-organizational relationship studies, little is known about the role of a firm’s 
size, particularly size asymmetry, in affecting buyer-supplier relationships. This 
essay evaluates current literature on firm size’s role in buyer-supplier relationships. 
We first discuss size asymmetry’s effect as discussed in supply chain literature. 
Second, we offer an overview of literature on size asymmetry in buyer-supplier 
relationships. Third, we provide suggestions for future research on size 
asymmetry, particularly involving supply chain disruptions. Last, we discuss 
challenges associated with measuring the firm size and collecting data in size 
asymmetry settings and provide recommendations to address related issues. 
Introduction 
Size asymmetry is a critical indicator in analyzing buyer-supplier 
relationships (BSRs). For an individual firm, firm size directly implies a firm’s 
access to internal and external resources, constraints, capacities, and growth 
strategy resulting from managerial decisions; it indirectly moderates the firm’s 
inventory leanness, operational efficiency, and sustainability development (Cao & 
Zhang, 2011; Chuang, Oliva, & Heim, 2019). For different size firms in a buyer-
supplier exchange, size asymmetry simplifies the complexity of the inter-
organizational relationship. In the research on BSRs, size asymmetry has been 
associated with other relationship characteristics, such as mutuality, conflict, 
interpersonal inconsistency, intensity, power, and dependence (Lee & Johnson, 
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2012; Ford & Saren, 2001; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 
1995). Moreover, Villena and Craighead (2017) examine how size asymmetry 
impacts opportunism and performance in BSRs. With only a few exceptions, the 
size asymmetry’s degree and directions are included and studied for buyers and 
suppliers (Villena & Craighead, 2017; Wang & Gerchak, 2003). Prior studies 
(Avittathur & Swamidass, 2007; Johnson & Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnson, 2012) 
primarily focus on one type of the size asymmetric relationship (e.g., larger buyers 
and smaller suppliers). In a size asymmetrical study, researchers often merely use 
size asymmetry as a context setting due to the convenience of available data 
(Devalkar & Krishnan, 2019; Lee & Klassen, 2008). Therefore, size asymmetry, 
one of the most simple but indicative factors, largely exists in BSRs yet is also 
surprisingly overlooked.  
 It is important to understand (a) the concept of asymmetry because 
asymmetric relationships are considered highly risky with inherent instability 
(Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995; Thomas & Esper, 2010) and (b) the different 
ways that asymmetries are captured and examined in the literature. Power 
imbalance (a) exists when firm A is more dependent on firm B than B on A and (b) 
influences sustainability development, supply chain collaboration, adaptation, and 
other buyer-supplier relationship performance and qualities (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005; Nyaga, Lynch, Marshal, & Ambrose, 2013; Touboulic, Chicksand & Walker, 
2012). While Brinkhoff, Ozer, and Sargut (2014) have suggested that asymmetric 
dependence negatively affects trust and has no effect on supply chain project 
success, Gulati and Sytch (2007) recommend considering the overall value 
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generated through power and dependence asymmetry. Asymmetric trust, the 
dyadic level of each party’s trust depending on the degree and direction, is 
suggested to disrupt the joint performance of the inter-organizational relationship 
(Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2009). Information asymmetry between two parties 
can significantly impact one party’s choice of contracts, such as quantity discount 
and wholesale price contracts, managing supplier quality, and delivery efficiency 
(Biwas, Avittathur, & Chatterjee, 2016; Cachon & Zhang, 2006; Corbett, Zhou, & 
Tang, 2004; Corbett & De Groote, 2000; Nikoofal & Gumus, 2018). Demand 
asymmetry, defined as a buyer’s biases in assessing the offering from different 
suppliers (i.e., incumbent challenger suppliers) and caused by the buyer’s 
switching inertia, significantly affects the buyer’s supplier selection decisions (Li, 
Madhok, Plaschka, & Verma, 2006). Yet, one of the most simple and salient 
asymmetries – size – in BSRs is oftentimes overlooked. Therefore, this essay’s 
two primary objectives are (a) to synthesize the extant body of literature on size 
asymmetry in BRSs and highlight the importance of scholarly inquiry and (b) to 
systematically identify key empirical, methodological, and theoretical opportunities 
and challenges in order to enhance our understanding size asymmetry’s role in 
BSRs. 
Overview of the Literature 
Rather than providing an extensive literature review, this essay highlights 
the salient distinctions of firm size’s measurements and size asymmetry’s role in 
BSRs studies. First, we focus on the measurement methods researchers refer to 
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when they discuss size asymmetry (i.e., large vs. small firms). Moreover, we 
identify the following roles of size asymmetry discussed in BSRs literature: context-
setting element, moderating variable, control variable, and main indicator. In Table 
6, we provide an overview of seminal papers (from the leading journals in supply 
chain management suggested by SCM Journal List) discussing size asymmetry in 
BRSs.  
Measurement of firm size.  
The measurement of firm size speaks to the criteria used to distinguish 
large, medium, and small buyer and supplier firms. More than half the studies 
about size asymmetry use the number of employees when assessing size; but the 
threshold adopted in the research varies across industries, regions, and 
methodologies. For example, Soundararajan and Brammer (2018) selected small 
sub-suppliers operating in the South Indian garment industry with fewer than 100 
workers. Nassimbeni (2003) follows the Italian regulation on the eyewear district 
and defines small suppliers as those with fewer than 22 employees. When the 
number of suppliers is enormous in a certain setting (e.g., overall manufacturing 
sector), researchers tend to bundle the small and medium firms together for 
analysis. For example, firms with fewer than 500 employees are considered small- 
and medium-size enterprises in Canada (Larson, Carr, & Dhariwal, 2005), whereas 
300 are considered the cut-off point for small- and medium-size enterprises in 
South Korea (Kim, Hur, & Schoenherr, 2015). To improve the quality of key 
informants likely possessing substantial knowledge of the focal firm’s BSRs, 
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Schoenherr, Griffith and Chandra (2014) categorized the firms with fewer than 50 
employees as small- and medium-size enterprises. Moreover, while a firm’s size 
is often measured as a continuous variable in modelling studies (Wang & Gerchak, 
2003), a more salient threshold was adopted in the vignette-based experimental 
work with a small firm of 70 employees and a large firm of 15,200 employees in 
the chemical industry to distinguish firm size (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). By 
assessing firm size’s rudimentary characteristic (i.e., the number of employees), 
the aforementioned papers offer valuable insights into potential room for unifying 
the firm-size category based on the number of employees for research and 
regulation purposes. 
 While the number of employees is the most frequently used measurement 
of firm size in BSRs literature, sales and revenue, order quantity, capacity and cost 
structure, and various combinations are often adopted to distinguish between large 
and small firms. Using firm sales, often represented by the calculated sales’ 
logarithmic value given the objective measure’s right-skewness, is the second-
most frequent approach (Wagner, 2003; Villena & Craighead, 2017). A 
combination of number of employees and annual sales is suggested as a safer 
approach (Lee & Klassen, 2008). Interestingly, Avittathur and Swamidass (2007) 
categorize large and small suppliers based on the buyer’s annual purchase, with 
a cut-off point at $2 million. Different from the general employee number and/or 
sales approaches, studies employing mathematical modelling methodologies tend 
to distinguish between large and small firms by assessing a firm’s capacity, 
production costs, operating costs, and other cost structures (Ozer and Raz, 2011; 
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Wang and Gerchak, 2003). The choice of criteria for firm size serves well for the 
choice of industry, region, and methodology for the research. Clearly, there is room 
for researchers to examine the validity of the use of criteria by replicating the extant 
research or comparing the influence of firm size’s effect using various 
measurement methods. 
Role of size asymmetry.  
The firm size’s role determines how size asymmetry is positioned and 
researched in BSRs studies. As noted in Table 6, size asymmetry in general 
serves as one of the following roles: context-setting element, moderating variable, 
control variable, or main indicator. When size asymmetry only serves as one of the 
context-setting elements, the firm size of buyers and suppliers is pre-determined 
and generally not analyzed. Having a size asymmetrical context setting is usually 
because (a) the data’s availability (e.g., from Office Depot, a large supplier) 
required the authors to research small-size customers in Boyer and Olson (2003); 
(b) the industry’s main structure (e.g., small and medium suppliers) represents 
most of the large buyers’ customers (Kim et al., 2015); (a) suitable to the topic’s 
focus, e.g., the important role of small- and medium-size enterprises in 
environmental performance is missing (Lee & Klassen, 2008). While authors 
usually justify the selection of the size asymmetric setting, they more often 
recognize the limitation of losing sight of BSRs’ omitted size combinations (Kim et 
al., 2015). Furthermore, some papers control for firm size. In  some situations, 
controlling for firm size does not yield statistical significance (Schoenherr et al., 
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2014); however, more often it does (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Kim et al., 2015; Leung, 
Li, & Sun, 2020). This significance demonstrates that accounting for firm size is 
important and that more work should focus on it. Across the literature’s 
hypotheses, firm size is tested for both main and moderating effects. For the main 
effect, supplier size is associated with differences in relationship exchanges 
(Larson et al., 2005). A firm’s financial performance after its implementation of total 
quality management (TQM) (Hendricks & Singhal, 2001) and decentralized 
channel performance (Wang & Gerchak, 2003) are related to firm size. For the 
moderating effect, firm size conditions a firm’s inventory leanness and operational 
efficiency (Chuang et al. 2019), supply chain collaboration, collaborative 
advantage, and firm performance (Cao & Zhang, 2011). These streams provide 
examples of the role firm size can play in an asymmetric BSR and, more 
importantly, emphasize that BSRs scholars should endeavor to expand 
understanding of size asymmetry’s role. Moreover, almost all the conversations 
involving size asymmetry in BSRs are under a normal operation setting (i.e., no 
disruptions). It is even more critical to understand firm size’s role in an asymmetric 
relationship when the supply chain is disrupted, the complexity is exponentially 
boosted, and the consequences can be devastating. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Research opportunities emerge from our literature overview. In this section, 
we provide an agenda for future research paths by discussing three sets of 
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challenges and opportunities. Furthermore, we propose a series of research 
questions noteworthy for researchers to consider in addressing each topic. 
Unifying the measurement of firm size.  
It is surprising to observe the variety of criteria BSRs scholars use to 
distinguish between large and small firms in the literature. The number of 
employees as firm size’s measurement is widely used by government 
administrations, such as the U.S. Small Business Administration. Even for studies 
using the number of employees, the cut-off point varies across studies and, mostly, 
regions. For example, one firm with 22 workers in Italy and one with 500 in Canada 
can both be considered referred “small firms” (Nassimbeni, 2003; Larson et al., 
2005). Understandably, small and large firms can be relative concepts in different 
regions and industries. However, it is confusing to call a firm with 500 employees 
“small” when the company must have established a systematic management 
system compared with one that has 10 employees and the owner makes almost 
all the decisions.  
The total assets, total sales, or median sales are the common measures 
widely used in corporate finance and adopted in many size asymmetry studies in 
BSRs (e.g., Villena & Craighead, 2017). Similar to using the number of employees, 
different thresholds of these financial values are employed in distinguishing 
between large and small firms. It is unrealistic to require all the researchers to 
follow one rule to identify size asymmetry, but the divergence of firm size’s 
measurement and the importance of developing a unified handbook must be 
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recognized and addressed. Otherwise, we will create more issues when we 
discuss size asymmetry and mean different things. To assess and address this 
issue, we suggest that researchers examine the following question: Do the effects 
hold when the extant literature is tested by using a different measurement of firm 
size? 
Firm size is indicative of a firm’s structure and hierarchical system. While a 
small firm with a few employees only listens to one voice for most of its decisions, 
a large firm often has a purchasing or supplying team along with three managers 
to approve a single change. Efficiency of decision-making process can be largely 
related to the complexity level of the firm structures. Team-based supplier or buyer 
decision-making scenarios can often be found in practice; however, research has 
mostly focused on the organizational or personal level while tackling team-based 
interactions. As such, a study of inter-organizational buyer-supplier teams in a size 
asymmetrical relationship would offer tremendous insight.  
Incorporating supply chain disruptions.  
To date, the BSRs literature involving size asymmetry is limited in the 
operational context without disruption. Size asymmetry’s role as a context element, 
moderator, control variable, and main indicator in BSRs has been largely studied 
in a non-disrupted condition; but little is known when the exchange is disrupted. 
Given the firm size’s critical role in BSRs, especially when asymmetry exists, it is 
unclear how different-size buyers in a disruption scenario perceive the relationship 
and whether they react differently when facing different-size suppliers. Firm size 
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asymmetry implies the existence of power, dependence, and asymmetry in 
switching costs and difficulties, which all matter in coping with supply chain 
disruptions. Therefore, it is critical for researchers and practitioners to understand 
how the firms perceive, react, and resolve the supply chain disruption when size 
asymmetry is involved. Thus, we propose two questions to examine size 
asymmetry’s effect in supply chain disruptions: (a) How do different-sized buyers 
(suppliers) perceive, react to, and resolve working with different-size suppliers 
(buyers) in supply chain disruptions (supplier-induced disruption/buyer-induced 
disruption)? (b) What are the contingencies and their influence on firm size’s effect 
in supply chain disruptions? 
Furthermore, a buyer-supplier relationship often involves more than just two 
parties: the buyer and the supplier. Specifically, supply chain disruptions are often 
caused by other forces, such as third-party logistics services, banks, 
intermediaries, and government. For example, a small supplier often has a small 
order and has to use a Less-Than-Truckload method to complete it. When a 
shortage of labor capacity occurs, the distribution center often prioritizes the Full-
Truckload orders from large suppliers. In that situation, the delivery’s delay is in 
fact caused by the distribution center, not the small supplier. It is important to 
understand how the buyer and the supplier in this scenario perceive and resolve 
this type of disruption. In a similar fashion, it is relevant how the buyer-supplier 
relationship is affected in a disruption when banks or government regulations are 
involved. Moreover, an intermediary plays a critical role of coordinating and 
harmonizing the buyer-supplier relationship by serving both a buyer and a supplier. 
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In a disrupted situation, intermediaries often proactively resolve the issue and 
sometimes absorb the loss to guard and secure the exchange. However, little is 
known about the intermediary’s importance in a size asymmetric buyer-supplier 
relationship, especially when the supply chain is disrupted. We suggest that 
scholars investigate the roles of the aforementioned third parties involved in BSRs, 
both in a normal and a disrupted operation. 
Seizing the empirical opportunities.  
Extant literature involving size asymmetry tends to use case study and 
survey data with very few archival and modelling approaches. Mainly focusing on 
the case study and the survey limits the researchers’ options due to the data 
access, one of the reasons the firm size’s various criteria are used. Moreover, most 
of the studies, except a few modelling papers, focus only on one-sided size 
asymmetry, i.e., large buyers and small suppliers or large suppliers and small 
buyers. Villena and Craighead’s (2017) study is the only one to date that has 
empirically examined all types of size asymmetry. 
Despite the increasing number of empirical studies involving size 
asymmetry, researchers face empirical challenges. Experiments are suitable for 
tackling these empirical challenges. However, the experimental approach has 
been largely overlooked in the size asymmetrical BSRs field except for Hartmann 
and  Moeller’s (2014) paper. Experimental work enables authors to examine the 
validity of different measures of firm size and is particularly suitable for behavioral 
research in supply chain. Experiments allow researchers to overcome the 
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challenges of data collection, thus achieving academic goals with a complete data 
set containing all types of asymmetries to investigate the research topic holistically. 
Conclusions 
 Although one of the basics of a firm’s characteristics, firm size has been 
surprisingly overlooked in BSRs but is often assessed by scholars using various 
criteria. Moreover, size asymmetry’s importance has been recognized as affecting 
the decisions and qualities of inter-organizational relationships, but it can be 
problematic and even misleading when people use the same term but refer to 
different measurements. Although size asymmetry’s rudimentary role has been 
examined in terms of power and dependence, BSRs have evolved into an 
increasingly dynamic and complex stage. There is no longer a simple dyadic 
relationship between one buyer and one supplier; instead, the relationship involves 
more parties and often disrupted conditions. COVID as a major disruption is a 
reminder that the supply chain will always be disrupted and that researchers have 
plenty of opportunities to advance understandings of size asymmetry and how it 
affects BSRs in both a normal operation day and a disrupted situation. Therefore, 
we encourage scholars across disciplines to join in this discussion and contribute 
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Key Constructs Definitions 
Construct Definitions Resources 
Supplier size • Number of employees of the suppliers U.S. Small Business 
Administration 
Disruption Type • Integrity: suppliers breaching values, 
principles, social norms 
• Competence: supplier's lack of 
knowledge and technical skills 
(Kim, Dirks, Coopers, & Ferrin, 
2004) 
 
Commitment • Enduring desire to maintain the 
relationship  
 
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994 
Mediated power • Using extrinsic motivation to exert 
influence on the target party 
• Collaborative use of individual bases: 
coercive, reward, legal legitimate 






Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Mean Std  
Dev 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
[1] Supplier size  .48 .50 1.00          
[2] Disruption type 
(1=integrity) 
Manipulated .06 1.00         
[3] Commitment 4.59 1.63 .21** -.11 1.00        
[4] Reward 4.65 1.81 .21** .02 .58** .55**       
[5] Monitor 5.49 1.19 .02 .12 .22 .16** 1.00      
[6] Coercive 5.49 1.21 .02 .13* .03 .04 .11 1.00     
[7] Gender 1.66 .48 .17** .07 .13* .12* -.02 .03 1.00    
[8] Age 35.51 10.42 -.05 -.05 -.03 -.01 .08 .14* -.17** 1.00   
[9] Work experience 10.45 8.91 -.18** .03 -.36** -.33** .02 .06 -.14* .68** 1.00  
[10] Education 4.04 .78 .07 -.14* .36** .32** .04 .08 .02 -.00 -.26** 1.00 
Note:  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 























5.02(.08) .000 4.15(.16) .000 5.45(.11) .000 5.46(.11) .000 
Large buyer/ 
large supplier (1) 
.29(.12) .017 .85(.24) .000 
 
.04(.16) .807 -.02(.16) .921 









R2 .03  .05  .00  .00  




Linear Regression Results 

























4.73(.16) .000 5.06(.09) .000 4.54(.18) .000 5.32(.12) .000 5.31(.12) .000 
Integrity 
disruption (1) 
-.49(.22) .026 .17(.12) .160 .01(.24) .970 .26(.16) .101 .25(.16) .128 











R2 .02  .01  .00  .01  .01  





PROCESS Model 1 Regression Results 






























.71(.31) .024 .21(.18) .238 .52(.35) .140 
 








.08(.42) .858 .13(.24) .585 .60(.48) .209 -.14(.32) .660 -.06(.32) .853 











R2 .07  .03  .06  .01  .01  
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
 
Table 6 





























Single-case study on a 
power imbalance’s 
effect on supplier 
sustainability adoption 
Context setting (i.e., 
firm size pre-selected 
or pre-determined but 













 195 surveys on SC 
knowledge 
management 
Controlled for firm 
size, not significant 













137 surveys on the 
effectiveness of buyer-
driven knowledge- 
transfer activities  
Controlled for buyer 
firm size, significantly 





JSCM Small vs. 
Large 





Literature review and 
183 surveys 
Main effect: the 
differences in 
relational exchange 










 173 surveys on supplier 
integration 
 
Main effect: firm size 
positively related to 
supplier integration 
efforts, not significant 





JOM Small Large Revenue  26 surveys about the 
flexibility of 
manufacturers and 
their small suppliers 
Context setting: 
profitability associated 









 # of 
employees 
TCE, RBV,  
Relational 
View, 
Web-survey of U.S. 
manufacturing firms 
conducted  
Moderation effect of 


























Controlled for firm 









 435 quality award 
winners are 
investigated in the 












JOM Small vs. 
Large 









effect of small firms 
on black-box 
integration but no 
effect of large firms 
Nassimbeni
, 2003 
JOM Small Large # of 
employees 
 Interviews with 5 
buyers and 49 surveys 
from suppliers  
Controlled for firm 





Large suppliers are 
favored in new 











A longitudinal multiple 
case study about sub-




Context setting: small 
sub-supplies selected 
 
The study focuses on 
the influence of 
framing social 
sustainability 














Capacity Modelling Centralized and 
decentralized 
equilibrium capacities 









POM Large Small # of 
employees 
















Firm size as a 
moderator in inventory 
leanness and efficiency 







POM Small Large  Modelling Trade credit’s role in 














 Case studies about 
factors that improve 
environmental 




Leung, Li, & 
Sun, 2020 
POM Small Large Mean total 
assets 
 Labor unions’ 
bargaining power  
Controlled for supplier 





POM Small vs. 
Large 



























Surveys and archival 
from 106 buying firms 




Footnote: Decision Sciences (DS), Journal of Business Logistics (JBL), Journal of Supply Chain Management 
(JSCM), Journal of Operations Management (JOM), Management Science (MS), Manufacturing & Service 









Imagine you work as a buyer for a large company, which has more than 10,000 
employees. The next pages will walk you through a business situation with one of 
your suppliers. 
 
Scenario (Large vs. Small supplier) 
Large Supplier 
You have a large supplier who has more than 10,000 employees. In the past, this 
supplier has been reliable and competent. The products and services this supplier 




You have a small supplier who has less than 50 employees. In the past, this 
supplier has been reliable and competent. The products and services this supplier 
provides could be purchased from alternative suppliers that have already been 
approved. 
 
Scenario (Competence vs. Integrity disruption) 
Competence Disruption 
Suppose the following situation has unfolded between you and the existing 
supplier. Recently, this supplier shipped a batch of defective products to your plant, 
resulting in your firm experiencing delays to your customers. It is the first time 
within the contractual history that this supplier created such an issue. The cause 
of this failure was traced back to the supplier's incorporation of raw materials that 
did not meet your specifications for the product. It has been conclusively 
determined that the supplier purchased lower-quality materials due to a lack of 




Suppose the following situation has unfolded between you and the existing 
supplier. Recently, this supplier shipped a batch of defective products to your plant, 
resulting in your firm experiencing delays to your customers. It is the first time 
within the contractual history that this supplier created such an issue. The cause 
of this failure was traced back to the supplier's incorporation of raw materials that 
did not meet your specifications for the product. It has been conclusively 
determined that the supplier purchased lower-quality materials in order to inflate 
their own margins by using this insufficient material. Please answer the following 












Commitment 1. We are committed to this supplier. 
2. Our firm is dedicated to this supplier. 
3. We are committed to the preservation of a good relationship 












5. Offer rewards if this supplier does not make similar mistakes 
    again within the remaining contract period. 
6. Ask only that your supplier fulfill their obligation to compensate     
    for the costs involved strictly based on the contract. 
7. Institute penalties against this supplier if they make similar 
    mistakes again within the remaining contract period. 
 
Measures of overall model fit: χ2/df =7.30; RMSEA=0.10, 90% CI [0.051, 0.159]; SRMR = 0.01; CFI = 0.99; 
TLI = 0.98. 
Note: 
1. The anchor for each item is : 1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree. 
2. All factor loadings are significant at p < 0.001. 
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CHAPTER III – CONCLUSION 
This dissertation contains two essays investigating the inter-organizational 
relationship. The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the decision-
making in buyer-supplier relationships contingent on various circumstances. Essay 
1’s findings enrich our understanding of perceptions of buyers dealing with large 
and small suppliers in a supplier-induced disruption. Buyers prefer to use mediated 
power with large suppliers than with small ones. This positive connection between 
the supplier’s firm size and the buyer’s preference in resolving the disruption is 
mediated by the buyer's commitment to the supplier. In addition, the type of 
disruption plays critical roles in affecting buyers’ perceptions directly and 
influencing the supplier size’s effectiveness. In response to the discussion of 
buyers’ different reactions to the large and small suppliers in Essay 1, Essay 2 
provides an overview of the literature about buyer-supplier relationships in a size 
asymmetric context. Synthesizing the literature, Essay 2 identifies the challenges 
in the size asymmetry literature and highlights the research opportunities 
presented in a research agenda. Evidence of the firm size in supplier-induced 
disruptions is provided in Essay 1, and a literature overview along with challenges 
and opportunities related to size asymmetry are offered for buyer-supplier 
relationship scholars. The following must be addressed: gaps in the studies of size 





Yu (Jade) Chu is a doctoral student in Supply chain Management at the 
Haslam College of Business, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Prior to joining 
the Ph.D. Program, Jade obtained a bachelor’s degree of Arts in Logistics 
Management from the Ocean University of China and a Master of Business 
Administration with the concentration of Supply Chain Management from the 
University of Arkansas. Her primary research interests include buyer-supplier 
relationships and supply chain transparency. She has a paper in the review 
process at Journal of Operations Management. Jade has taught twice during her 
time in the Ph.D. program and been recognized for her teaching efforts, receiving 
the Outstanding Doctoral Student Teaching Award in Supply Chain Management 
in 2018. 
